Subject: Iraq: "Absolutely Nothing," by retired US Navy Chief Warrant Officer Jim
Wright, Stonekettle Station, June 14, 2014
(plus)
Of course I have been reading masses of material about Iraq again lately. I think this first one provides a good enough summary!
Stonekettle Station is a site with a lot of commenters who've been associated with the U.S. military. The comments are really interesting.*
The rest of these, along with what I knew before, have given me the picture that the big problem for Sunni Islamist Muslims in Iraq and the reason why many or most of the Sunni Islamists in Iraq are supporting this Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant ("ISIS") jihad, despite most Sunni's being very afraid of ISIS along with everyone else, is that U.S. invasion legacy Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki (Wikipedia link), himself from the Shia Islam Muslim tribe, is what one might call a truly nasty SOB when it comes to government policies related to the other major Muslim tribe in Iraq, the members of Sunni Islam, in their daily lives throughout the country. Nouri al-Maliki, was expected to be the U.S. puppet left after the invasion. That has not worked out as hoped--hoped by those looking to stay in change in Iraq by proxy I mean--mainly because the Iraqi people and especially many of the members of the elected Iraqi Council of Representatives of Iraq (Parliament) regard the United States as foreign invaders and occupiers not to be accepted but to be gotten out and kept out.
I have read that much of the foreign part of ISIS--some local Sunni youths are joining ISIS now--is comprised of members of and others paid by the Wahhabi movement Sunni Muslims, the majority of whom are from Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, AND Saudi Arabia. Wahhabi movement Muslims are NOT like the Sunni Muslims of Iraq and other places in the world. In fact some Sunnis deny that a Wahhabi Islamist is a Sunni Islamist at all.
It appears clear that anything the U.S. government or any other foreign government does to support the Maliki government in Iraq is just going to prolong the civil war in Iraq so that it will not be over as long as there is anyone left there who is able to pull a trigger. Weapons and ammunition are plentiful. If the tribes in Iraq can get themselves rid of Maliki then they might be able to work things out sometime. They had been getting along quite well until we showed up.
* * *
"inside mosul: how did extremists take over one of iraq's biggest cities in just five days?" by niqash Special Correspondent Mosul, Niqash: briefings from inside and across Iraq, June 10, 2014
"inside mosul: why iraqis are celebrating islamic extremists’ takeover of their city," by niqash Special Correspondent Mosul, Niqash: briefings from inside and across Iraq, June 12, 2014
"How can the U.S. help Maliki when Maliki’s the problem?" , by Marc Lynch, a Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University, where he is also director of both the Institute for Middle East Studies and the Middle East Studies Program. (Wikipedia link), The Washington Post, June 12, 2014
"Unthinkable Thoughts in the Debate About ISIS in Iraq," by Ross Caputi, a seemingly intelligent young man who nonetheless participated in the second battle of Fallujah in November 2004. June 15, 2014
"Iraq: The real battle is to persuade Sunnis they can be truly equal citizens," by Nussaibah Younis, The Guardian/The Observer, June 14, 2014
For bigger detail, a bigger Middle East picture that includes complexities involving Syria, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Israel Lebanon, Jordan, and others I may have missed, this next is good:
"Syria’s Very Local Regional Conflict,"** by Yezid Sayigh, Carnegie Middle East Center, Beirut, Lebanon, June 9, 2014
Larry
* ...interesting except the comments about grammar, which by the way are not rudeness. Jim Wright explicitly requests grammar corrections to his writings.
** ...part of the Carnagie Global Dynamics of the Syrian Conflict series.
--
You don’t have to be tough to be brave.--Harper Lee, To Kill a Mockingbird (1960)
(plus)
Of course I have been reading masses of material about Iraq again lately. I think this first one provides a good enough summary!
Stonekettle Station is a site with a lot of commenters who've been associated with the U.S. military. The comments are really interesting.*
The rest of these, along with what I knew before, have given me the picture that the big problem for Sunni Islamist Muslims in Iraq and the reason why many or most of the Sunni Islamists in Iraq are supporting this Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant ("ISIS") jihad, despite most Sunni's being very afraid of ISIS along with everyone else, is that U.S. invasion legacy Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki (Wikipedia link), himself from the Shia Islam Muslim tribe, is what one might call a truly nasty SOB when it comes to government policies related to the other major Muslim tribe in Iraq, the members of Sunni Islam, in their daily lives throughout the country. Nouri al-Maliki, was expected to be the U.S. puppet left after the invasion. That has not worked out as hoped--hoped by those looking to stay in change in Iraq by proxy I mean--mainly because the Iraqi people and especially many of the members of the elected Iraqi Council of Representatives of Iraq (Parliament) regard the United States as foreign invaders and occupiers not to be accepted but to be gotten out and kept out.
I have read that much of the foreign part of ISIS--some local Sunni youths are joining ISIS now--is comprised of members of and others paid by the Wahhabi movement Sunni Muslims, the majority of whom are from Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, AND Saudi Arabia. Wahhabi movement Muslims are NOT like the Sunni Muslims of Iraq and other places in the world. In fact some Sunnis deny that a Wahhabi Islamist is a Sunni Islamist at all.
It appears clear that anything the U.S. government or any other foreign government does to support the Maliki government in Iraq is just going to prolong the civil war in Iraq so that it will not be over as long as there is anyone left there who is able to pull a trigger. Weapons and ammunition are plentiful. If the tribes in Iraq can get themselves rid of Maliki then they might be able to work things out sometime. They had been getting along quite well until we showed up.
* * *
"inside mosul: how did extremists take over one of iraq's biggest cities in just five days?" by niqash Special Correspondent Mosul, Niqash: briefings from inside and across Iraq, June 10, 2014
"inside mosul: why iraqis are celebrating islamic extremists’ takeover of their city," by niqash Special Correspondent Mosul, Niqash: briefings from inside and across Iraq, June 12, 2014
"How can the U.S. help Maliki when Maliki’s the problem?" , by Marc Lynch, a Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University, where he is also director of both the Institute for Middle East Studies and the Middle East Studies Program. (Wikipedia link), The Washington Post, June 12, 2014
"Unthinkable Thoughts in the Debate About ISIS in Iraq," by Ross Caputi, a seemingly intelligent young man who nonetheless participated in the second battle of Fallujah in November 2004. June 15, 2014
"Iraq: The real battle is to persuade Sunnis they can be truly equal citizens," by Nussaibah Younis, The Guardian/The Observer, June 14, 2014
For bigger detail, a bigger Middle East picture that includes complexities involving Syria, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Israel Lebanon, Jordan, and others I may have missed, this next is good:
"Syria’s Very Local Regional Conflict,"** by Yezid Sayigh, Carnegie Middle East Center, Beirut, Lebanon, June 9, 2014
Larry
* ...interesting except the comments about grammar, which by the way are not rudeness. Jim Wright explicitly requests grammar corrections to his writings.
** ...part of the Carnagie Global Dynamics of the Syrian Conflict series.
--
You don’t have to be tough to be brave.--Harper Lee, To Kill a Mockingbird (1960)
